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Abstract 
 
This article examines Zimbabwe's indigenisation legislation, 
points out some of its inadequacies and draws lessons from 
South Africa's experiences in implementing its own 
indigenisation legislation. Both countries have encountered 
challenges relating to an upsurge in unethical business conduct 
aimed at defeating the objectives of their black economic 
empowerment programmes, policies and legislation. This 
practice is called business fronting. However, while South Africa 
has succeeded in enacting a credible piece of legislation aimed 
at addressing this issue, Zimbabwe has yet to do so. The article 
points out that the failure to specifically regulate against 
business fronting poses the most significant threat to the 
attainment of the laudable aims and objectives of the 
indigenisation programme and related legislation. In order to 
avoid becoming a regulatory regime that is notorious not only for 
being functionally ineffective but also for tacitly permitting 
racketeering in reality, the article argues for the adoption of anti-
fronting legislation in Zimbabwe using the South African 
legislation as a model. 
Keywords 
Black economic empowerment; indigenisation; business fronting; 
Zimbabwe; South Africa; distributive justice. 
………………………………………………………. 
Regulating Against Business "Fronting" 
to Advance Black Economic Empowerment 
in Zimbabwe: Lessons from South Africa 
TV Warikandwa* and PC Osode** 
Pioneer in peer-reviewed,  
open access online law publications. 
Author 
Tapiwa V Warikandwa and Patrick 
C Osode 
Affiliation 
University of Fort Hare 
South Africa 
Email 
TWarikandwa@ufh.ac.za 
POsode@ufh.ac.za  
Date published 
15 March 2017 
Editor Prof C Rautenbach 
How to cite this article 
Warikandwa TV and Osode PC " 
Regulating Against Business 
"Fronting" to Advance Black 
Economic Empowerment in 
Zimbabwe: Lessons from South 
Africa" PER / PELJ 2017(20) - DOI 
http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727- 
3781/2017/v20i0a735 
Copyright 
. 
DOI 
http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727- 
3781/2017/v20i0a735 
TV WARIKANDWA & PC OSODE  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  2 
1  Introduction 
Black economic empowerment programmes in Zimbabwe and South Africa 
have often seen the indigenous people who were previously and who 
remain largely excluded from the economic mainstream going into a state 
of euphoria1 based on the genuine belief that such programmes are an 
effective panacea2 for their existential socio-economic challenges.3 This 
belief appears to be affirmed by the values set out in the African Charter on 
Human and People's Rights,4 which recognise and advance the right to the 
free disposition of wealth and natural resources in the best interests of 
indigenous peoples.5 It is thus not surprising to see that indigenisation in 
Zimbabwe is founded on a socio-political creed that land and mineral 
resources exist in the country's territory to a greater extent6 for the benefit 
of indigenous people7 and to a lesser extent for multinational corporations.8 
The term multinational corporation, for the purposes of the implementation 
of indigenous economic empowerment laws, is often controversially 
                                            
* Tapiwa V Warikandwa. LLB; LLM; LLD (Fort Hare). Post-doctoral Fellow, Department 
of Mercantile Law, Nelson R Mandela School of Law, University of Fort Hare, South 
Africa. Email: TWarikandwa@ufh.ac.za. 
**  Patrick C Osode. LLB (Jos); BL (Nig); LLM (Lagos); SJD (Toronto). Professor, 
Department of Mercantile Law, Nelson R Mandela School of Law, University of Fort 
Hare, South Africa. Email: POsode@ufh.ac.za. 
1  Gallagher 2015 JMAS 27. Also see Moyo "Political Economy of Transformation" 23-
24. 
2  Chowa and Mukuvare 2013 RJE 14. 
3  Ngwerume and Massimo 2014 JPAG 4. Also see Government of Zimbabwe First 
Report of the Thematic Committee 6; Andreasson "Indigenisation and 
Transformation"; Matunhu 2012 SAPRJ 5; ZELA 2013 
http://www.zela.org/docs/publications/2013/uae.pdf; Mabhena and Moyo 2014 IOSR-
JHSS 72; and Zikhali, Ncube and Tshuma 2014 IJHSS 27. 
4  See art 21(1) as read with art 22(1) of the African Charter on Human and People's 
Rights (1986). 
5  Andreasson 2010 PG 424. Also see the case of AMCO v Republic of Indonesia 
(Merits) 1992 89 ILR 368 paras 405, 466; and De Sanchez v Banco Central de 
Nicaragua 770 F 2d 1385 US Court of Appeals 5th Circuit (19 September 1985) para 
17, for a comparative analysis of similar practices in other jurisdictions in the world. 
6  Section 3(1)(a) of the Zimbabwean Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act 
[Chapter 14:33] of 2007 (herein after IEEA) stipulates that: "at least fifty-one per 
centum of the shares of every public company and any other business shall be owned 
by indigenous Zimbabweans…" Also see ss 3(1)(b)(iii), 3(1)(c)(i) and 3(5) of the IEEA. 
7  Section 2(1)(b) of the IEEA. Section 2(1)(b) must be read together with s 14 and s 
20(1)(c) of the Zimbabwean Constitution Act 20 of 2013. Also see s 1 of the South 
African Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 (B-BBEE Act), 
which provides that: "'black people' is a generic term which means African, Coloureds 
and Indians". In the same section of the B-BBEE Act, it further provided that "'broad-
based economic empowerment' means the economic empowerment of all black 
people including women, workers, youth, people with disabilities and people living in 
rural areas through diverse but integrated socio-economic strategies …"  
8  Leal-Arcas International Trade and Investment Law 178. Also see Munyedza 2011 
BEJ 9. 
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understood to refer to western-owned companies and not Asian-owned 
companies.9 The need to remedy colonial injustices and significantly 
improve the extent of the participation of indigenous Zimbabweans in the 
country's economic activities is often advanced as the primary justification 
for indigenisation programmes which seek to economically empower 
previously disadvantaged Zimbabweans.10 Premised on the need to 
redistribute the country's economic resources in a manner that favours 
indigenous Zimbabweans,11 Magure points out that the indigenisation 
programme has promised much to the anxious and highly expectant 
majority but delivered little.12 Instead, many of the benefits from the 
indigenisation programme have gone to a few well-connected elites13 due 
largely to unethical business practices such as business fronting.14 
Accordingly, in order to ensure that each and every indigenous Zimbabwean 
benefits from the indigenisation of land as well as other economic resources 
and is enabled to enter the economic mainstream, the IEEA urgently 
requires strengthening through the inclusion of specific anti-fronting clauses 
                                            
9  Makwiramiti 2011 http://www.polity.org.za/article/in-the-name-of-economic-empower 
ment-a-case-for-south-africa-and-zimbabwe-2011-02-24. The Zimbabwean President 
Robert Mugabe once argued that, "Why should we continue to have companies and 
organisations that are supported by America and Britain without hitting them back? 
The time has come for us to revenge and one way of (doing this) is for us to use the 
IEEA. That Act gives us authority to take over the companies. We can begin with 51%, 
but in some cases we must read the riot act and say this is only 50% but if you do not 
lift the sanctions we will take 100%." Also see Matyszak 2010 
http://researchandadvocacyunit.org/system/files/Everything%20you%20ever%20wan
ted%20to%20know.pdf; and Matyszak 2013 http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/ 
demgg/rau_zimplats_saga_120423.pdf. 
10  Section 2(1)(b) of the IEEA. Also see s 2 of the South African B-BBEE Act; Department 
of Trade and Industry 2007 http://www.thedti.gov.za; Global Business Holdings 2011 
http://gbholdings.org; Watson 2010 http://www.minorityperspective.co.uk; and 
Sokwanele 2010 http://www.sokwanele.com. 
11  See the definition of "indigenisation" in the s 2(1)(b) of the IEEA and the objectives of 
the black economic empowerment programme in s 2 of the South African B-BBEE Act. 
12  Magure 2012 JCAS 67; Matyszak 2010 http://researchandadvocacyunit.org/ 
system/files/Everything%20you%20ever%20wanted%20to%20know.pdf; 
Raftopoulos and Moyo 1995 EASSRR 17; Carter and Wilton 2006 JEC 65; Matyszak 
2016 http://researchandadvocacyunit.org/system/files/Chaos%20Clarified.pdf; An 
dreasson 2003 JCAS 384; Magaisa 2015 http://alexmagaisa.com/the-trouble-with-
zimbabwes-indigenisation-policy/; and Sibanda 2014 IJPLP 24. 
13  Magure 2012 JCAS 68-69. Also see Tekere Lifetime of Struggle 11; and Raftopoulos 
"State, NGOs and Democratisation" 21-45. The authors point out that the Government 
led by the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) has created a 
fertile environment for the emergence of a "national bourgeoisie". The national 
bourgeoisie consists of members of the ruling party ZANU PF who deliberately pursue 
their objectives as an integral part of the ruling party's politics of patronage.  
14  Anon 2012 https://www.modernghana.com/news/399099/zimbabwe-equity-laws-
should-benefit-poor-bank-chief.html. Also see Gaomab 2009 http://www.fesnam.org; 
Helmsing Perspectives of Local Economic Development. 
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or alternatively the enactment of an independent anti-fronting legislation.15 
It is therefore not surprising that at the time of writing this article, the Public 
Sector Corporate Governance Bill had been tabled before parliament with a 
view to introducing a law which addresses corruption and other related 
maladministration challenges in the public and private sectors.16 
Specifically, the law will seek to address any murky business activities in 
both the private and public sectors and ensure that such practices are 
punishable at law.17 This in itself is sufficient evidence of the Zimbabwean 
Government's acknowledgement of the inadequacies of the existing laws in 
fighting corruption and other irregular business activities, including business 
fronting. 
This article argues that presently, because of the omission to provide for the 
problem of fronting, Zimbabwe has inadequate black economic 
empowerment legislation which has created a reality in which the benefits 
of the legislation's implementation appear to accrue largely to the well-
connected, politically favoured elites and their associates.18 The article is 
divided into six parts. The first part introduces the concept of indigenisation 
in Zimbabwe, while the second presents a brief description of the country's 
indigenisation regulatory framework. The third part undertakes an analysis 
of incidents of business fronting in Zimbabwe and shows why it is easy to 
front. The fourth part examines the regulation of business fronting in South 
Africa, while the fifth part draws lessons for Zimbabwe from South Africa's 
amendment of its black economic empowerment legislation in order to 
effectively address the challenge of fronting. The last part of the article offers 
recommendations on how best to strengthen Zimbabwe’s indigenisation 
laws in preventing fronting. 
                                            
15  Incorporating anti-fronting clauses in the IEEA or enacting anti-fronting legislation 
would be a sign that the Zimbabwean government is sincere in its efforts to arrest the 
scourge of fronting, which is a significant aspect of corruption in Zimbabwe. It will also 
show that the Government is serious about implementing its commitments regarding 
the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Protocol against Corruption 
adopted on the 14th of August 2001 in Blantyre, Malawi.  
16  The Bill’s main objective is to address the inadequacies of the existing laws on 
corporate governance in addressing issues of unethical business practices in 
Zimbabwe. The presentation of the Bill before parliament has been linked to the need 
to ensure that individuals, government officials, and company representatives do not 
defeat the objectives of the Zim Asset Policy. The Zim Asset Policy itself "… was 
crafted to achieve sustainable development and social equity anchored on 
indigenisation, economic empowerment and employment creation which will be 
largely propelled by the judicious exploitation of the country’s abundant human and 
natural resources". See the full Zim Asset Policy at Government of Zimbabwe Date 
Unknown http://www.dpcorp.co.zw/assets/zim-asset.pdf. 
17  Mugabe 2016 http://allafrica.com/stories/201605090140.html.  
18  See Magure 2012 JCAS 69.  
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2  Zimbabwean indigenisation law 
Indigenisation policies and processes in Zimbabwe are regulated by the 
Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (IEEA).19 The IEEA 
provides the policy definition of empowerment as: 
The creation of an environment which enhances the performance of … 
economic activities of indigenous Zimbabweans into which they would have 
been introduced or involved through indigenisation.20  
Emphasis in the definition is clearly on the compelling need to ensure that 
the benefits of the indigenisation policy cascade down to indigenous 
Zimbabweans in their multitudes and not just to a few politically connected 
elites and their foreign business partners, which may be the current state of 
affairs.21 It is submitted that the need to maximise the reach or dispersal of 
those benefits is the reason why section 2(1)22 of the IEEA further defines 
indigenisation as: 
… a deliberate involvement of indigenous Zimbabweans in the economic 
activities of the country, to which hitherto they had no access, so as to ensure 
the equitable ownership of the nation's resources.23  
The indigenisation policy of Zimbabwe, the IEEA, as well as the 
Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Regulations seek to achieve 
the following objectives: 
a) transforming indigenous Zimbabweans from being mere suppliers of 
labour and consumers to participants in the country's economy as 
owners of businesses;24 
                                            
19  Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act [Chapter 14:33] of 2007 (herein after 
referred to as the IEEA). 
20  Section 2(1) of the IEEA. 
21  Moyo "Land Reform and Redistribution" 29. Also see Fargher The Herald 10; Moyo 
"Scramble for Land in Africa" 29; Philip 2012 JPS 681; Moyo "Primitive Accumulation" 
61; Carmody "Ecolonization" 169; and Mazingi and Kamidza "Inequality in Zimbabwe" 
371. 
22  Section 2(1) also defines empowerment as "…the creation of an environment which 
enhances the performance of the economic activities of indigenous Zimbabweans into 
which they would have been introduced or involved through indigenization". 
23  Section 2(1) of the IEEA. 
24  Section 2(1) of the IEEA. 
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b) transferring equity shareholding in all businesses with a net asset 
value of United States Dollars (USD) 500 000 and above to 
indigenous Zimbabweans;25 
c) promoting the procurement of at least 51% of goods and services 
needed by all government departments, statutory bodies and local 
authorities from businesses controlled by indigenous 
Zimbabweans;26 
d) establishing a National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment 
Board (NIEEB) to advise the Minister and manage the Indigenisation 
and Economic Empowerment Fund;27 
e) establishing an Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Fund to 
provide assistance to indigenous Zimbabweans for the purposes of 
financing share acquisitions, warehousing shares under employee 
share ownership schemes or trust, and management buy-ins and 
buy-outs;28 
f) setting up Employee, Management and Community Share 
Ownership Schemes or Trusts as part of the 51% indigenous 
shareholding to ensure the broad-based participation of indigenous 
Zimbabweans in the economy;29 
g) reserving business sectors such as the production of food and cash 
crops, employment agencies, estate agencies, milk processing, 
marketing and distribution, advertising agencies, and the provision of 
local arts and craft to indigenous Zimbabweans;30 and 
h) providing a dispute resolution platform in the form of the 
Administrative Court to be available to any business aggrieved by a 
                                            
25  Sections 3(1) and 3(5) of the IEEA. Also see Indigenisation and Economic 
Empowerment General Notice 459 of 2011 and Indigenisation and Economic 
Empowerment General Notice 280 of 2012. 
26  Section 3(1)(f) of the IEEA. 
27  Section 7 of the IEEA. 
28  Section 12 of the IEEA. 
29  Section 12(2)(a)(ii) of the IEEA. 
30  Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (General) 
(Amendment) Regulation Statutory Instrument 66 of 2013 [CAP 14:33]. These 
reserved economic sectors include the following: the agricultural production of food 
and cash crops; transport (buses, taxis and car hire services); the retail and wholesale 
trades; barbershops; hairdressing and beauty salons; employment agencies; estate 
agencies; valet services; grain milling; bakeries; tobacco grading and packaging; 
tobacco processing; advertising agencies; milk processing; the provision of local arts; 
and marketing and distribution. Also see s 3(1)(e) of the IEEA.  
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Minister's decision to apportion 51% of such an entity to indigenous 
Zimbabweans.31 
The methodology for implementing the controversial IEEA32 is prescribed in 
the equally controversial Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment 
(General) Regulations.33 The controversy lies mainly in the 51% 
indigenisation equity threshold imposed on all foreign-owned businesses, 
as illustrated in the Table below: 
Sector Minimum net 
asset value 
Lesser share of 
non-indigenous 
businesses 
Years to 
comply 
Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment General Notice 459 of 
2011 
Manufacturing Of or above 
one hundred 
thousand 
dollars (USD 
100 000) 
26% 1st year 
  36% 2nd year 
  46% 3rd year 
  51% 4th year 
Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment General Notice 280 of 
2012 – Other Sectors 
Financial Services See Part I of 
Notice 280 
51% 1 year 
Tourism See Part II of 
Notice 280 
51% 1 year 
Education and Sport See Part III of 
Notice 280 
51% 1 year 
                                            
31  Sections 20(1)(c) and 20(2) of the IEEA. 
32  Sections 3(1)(a), 3(b)(iii), 3(c)(i), and 3(5) of the IEEA. Also see Magaisa 2012 
http://www.zimeye.org/the-illegality-ofZimbabwe%E2%80%99s-new-indigenisation-
regulations-in-the-banking-and-education; and Matyszak 2016 http://researchand 
advocacyunit.org/system/files/Chaos%20Clarified.pdf 1-20. 
33  See the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (General) Regulations Statutory 
Instrument 21 of 2010 [CAP 14:33], which was gazetted on the 29th of January 2010 
and subsequently came into effect on the 1st of March 2010. 
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Arts, Entertainment 
and Culture 
See Part IV of 
Notice 280 
51% 1 year 
Engineering and 
Construction 
See Part V of 
Notice 280 
51% 1 year 
Energy See Part VI of 
Notice 280 
51% 1 year 
Services See Part VII of 
Notice 280 
51% 1 year 
Telecommunications See Part VIII of 
Notice 280 
30-51% 1 year 
Transport and Motor 
Industry 
See Part IX of 
Notice 280 
51% 1 year 
Source: Government of Zimbabwe IEE General Notices 459 of 2011 and 
280 of 2012 
The specified share transactions issues regarding the 51% equity threshold 
appear to constitute a threat to business investments in that they are not 
negotiable.34 Section 3(5) of the IEEA provides that an exemption from 
complying with the said regulatory requirements is permissible only in 
instances where the foreign-owned company is able to furnish evidence that 
the transfer of a lower percentage of its shares or a longer period of 
achieving the indigenisation objectives is appropriate in its special or unique 
circumstances.35 However, section 3(5) has been a source of contention as 
policy makers had appeared to suggest that it implies that the 51% equity 
threshold is negotiable.36 In fact section 3(5) suggests otherwise, as it 
provides that: 
The Minister may prescribe that a lesser share than fifty-one per centum or a 
lesser interest than a controlling interest may be acquired by indigenous 
Zimbabweans in any business in terms of subsections (1)(b)(iii), (1)(c)(i), 
(1)(d) and (e) in order to achieve compliance with those provisions, but in 
doing so he or she shall prescribe the general maximum timeframe within 
which the fifty-one per centum share or controlling interest shall be attained.37  
                                            
34  For a detailed analysis of these issues see Matyszak 2016 
http://researchandadvocacyunit.org/system/files/Chaos%20Clarified.pdf 15-18. 
35  Section 3(5) of the IEEA. Also see ss 4, 7 and 8 of the Indigenisation and Economic 
Empowerment (General) Regulations Statutory Instrument 21 of 2010 [CAP 14:33]; 
and ss 4, 7 and 8 of the 2010 regulations. 
36  Matyszak 2016 http://researchandadvocacyunit.org/system/files/Chaos%20 
Clarified.pdf 15-18. 
37  Section 3(5) of the IEEA. Emphasis added. 
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In justifying the indigenisation programme as reflected in the IEEA, the 
government has been consistent in advancing and relying upon a populist 
argument that the country's land and mineral resources should benefit 
Zimbabweans and not only multinational companies.38 This is probably 
premised on the genuine need to ensure that indigenous Zimbabweans and 
not multinational companies receive the greater share of the proceeds 
flowing from the exploitation of the country's land and mineral resources. 
Section 2(1) of the IEEA pursues a distributive justice agenda.39 This is 
because the ultimate policy goal of transferring the ownership of the land 
and mineral resources to indigenous Zimbabweans is the closing of the 
ever-widening inequalities40 between the wealthy and the indigent.41 
Accordingly, a theoretical construction such as the distributive justice 
theory, which advocates a just and fair distribution of the benefits and 
proceeds originating from the land and mineral resources in any society, 
becomes strongly affirming of the Zimbabwean indigenisation process.42 
Accordingly, the government should in this regard be applauded for trying 
to ensure that multinational corporations do not continue to take the larger 
share of the said proceeds43 and benefits while indigenous people remain 
exposed to various forms of exploitation.44 To address such socio-economic 
injustices, it is clearly plausible to adopt legal policies whose objectives are 
                                            
38  Section 3(1)(e) of the IEEA prohibits foreign investment in sectors reserved for 
Zimbabweans. Also see Matyszak 2010 http://researchandadvocacyunit.org/ 
system/files/Everything%20you%20ever%20wanted%20to%20know.pdf. 
39  Rawls Theory of Justice 94. The distributive justice theory was originally postulated by 
John Rawls. The underlying rationale of this theory is that people should be 
compensated for their past misfortunes. In the Zimbabwean context such misfortunes 
would relate to the colonial injustices which precluded indigenous Zimbabweans from 
participating in mainstream economic activities. 
40  Government of Zimbabwe Date Unknown http://www.dpcorp.co.zw/assets/zim-
asset.pdf. 
41  Matyszak 2010 http://researchandadvocacyunit.org/system/files/Everything%20 
you%20ever%20wanted%20to%20know.pdf; and Sithole and Chikerema 2014 ZJPE 
84. 
42  Stark 2010 BC Third World LJ 3. Also see O'Connel Vindicating Socio-economic 
Rights 7.3; Stark "Jam Tomorrow" 263. 
43  The courts in De Sanchez v Banco Central de Nicaragua 770 F 2d 1385 US Court of 
Appeals 5th Circuit (19 September 1985) paras 405, 466 and AMCO v Republic of 
Indonesia (Merits) 1992 89 ILR 368 para 17 emphasised that states do enjoy a 
customary international law right to regain the ownership of industries as part of their 
territorial and economic sovereignty. A substantial foreign ownership of national 
resources and/or business sectors threatens national and economic sovereignty. Also 
see Leal-Arcas International Trade and Investment Law 178; Chekera and Nmehielle 
2013 AJLS 69; and Murombo 2013 LEDJ 31. 
44  Such forms of exploitation include labour market abuse, the deprivation of basic social 
services, and marginalisation from participating in the Zimbabwean economy. See 
Mazingi and Kamidza 2011 http://www.osisa.org/sites/default/files/sup_files/chapter 
_5_-_zimbabwe.pdf.  
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directed at reform of the society’s economic order in order to achieve an 
equitable, fair and just distribution of responsibilities and benefits.45 
However, it must be ascertained whether the contemporary capitalist and/or 
neo-liberal economic order46 can effectively accommodate social policies 
designed to bridge the gap between the rich and the poor and, for that 
purpose, embrace the implementation of socio-economic programmes 
implicit in the distributive justice theory, such as indigenisation 
programmes.47  
Alvarez has pointed out that today neoliberal ideology shapes institutions 
whose policies account for contemporary international economic law.48 
Governments are not an exception. This concern is readily manifest in the 
fact that whereas section 3 of the IEEA and the broad tenor of Indigenisation 
and Economic Empowerment General Notice 114 of 2011 is that every 
Zimbabwean should benefit from the country's resources, section 2(1) of the 
IEEA excludes the State/Government as a specific beneficiary of 
indigenisation. This suggests that only individuals and juristic persons were 
earmarked to benefit from the indigenisation programme. Reference in 
section 2(1) of the IEEA is made to the following categories of beneficiaries 
as being the targets of indigenisation: "1) a natural person, 2) a company 3) 
an association, syndicate or partnership amongst others ...".49 
There may be some justification for the exclusion of the government as a 
direct beneficiary of indigenisation. After all, the listed categories of 
beneficiaries are subjects of the State, whose business operations have the 
potential to directly or indirectly contribute to the fiscus and/or revenue base 
of the country. However, the net effect of excluding the State as a direct 
beneficiary of the indigenisation laws in Zimbabwe is that unscrupulous 
individuals50 and companies owned by such individuals or persons related 
                                            
45  Ratnapala Jurisprudence 335. 
46  The neoliberalism economic policy model and ideology places emphasis on free trade. 
It allows for minimal state intervention in socio-economic affairs and aggressively 
advocates the freedom of capital and trade. See Monibot How Did We Get into This 
Mess? 12; Harvey 2006 GA 145; Gamble Crisis without End? 10; and Genev 2005 
EEPS 343. 
47  Warikandwa and Osode 2014 SJ 44. 
48  Alvarez and Barney 2008 SEJ 171. 
49  See s 2(1) of the IEEA. 
50  Transparency International 2014 https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results. The 
2014 Transparency International Global Corruptions Index reveals that Zimbabwe is 
one of the most corrupt states in Southern Africa and the world in general with a 
ranking of number 156 out of 175. In trying to explain the source of such corruption, 
Transparency International chairperson Jose Ugaz pointed out that: "A significantly 
lowly ranking is perhaps an indication of predominant bribery, absence of adequate 
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to or connected to them have become largely responsible for an upsurge in 
corruption.51 As a result the gains from the mineral resources which should 
be available for the pursuit of the best interests of the State and its subjects 
at large are being externalised through the collusion of these companies 
and individuals.52 If excluding the State as a beneficiary of indigenisation53 
promotes corrupt business practices such as fronting, then the underlying 
legal or policy position adopted is problematic, at least in the Zimbabwean 
context.54 As a result of the exclusion, instead of increasing the participation 
of the black majority, the current regulatory practice may increase the pace 
of widening inequality between the wealthy and the indigent;55 and it could 
also undermine the implementation of the indigenisation programmes and 
laws as the resources necessary for that purpose would not be available.56 
                                            
sentencing as well as punishment for corruption and public institutions that do not act 
in response to citizens' needs". 
51  Coltart 2008 https://www.cato.org/publications/development-policy-analysis/decade-
suffering-zimbabwe-economic-collapse-political-repression-under-robert-mugabe. 
52  Chitereka and Hamauswa 2014 ZJPE 69. Also see Matunhu 2011 AJHC 65; and 
Murombo 2013 LEDJ 33. 
53  Makoni 2014 COC 160. Indigenisation is defined as "a Government-initiated process 
whereby it limits certain industrial sectors to its native citizens only, and hence forces 
foreigners (aliens) to sell those targeted assets. The Government does not have 
ownership of the assets, but rather ensures a stronger hold over its domestic economy 
and through indigenisation can encourage and ensure the growth of local firms and 
individuals". Also see Rood 1976 JMAS 427; and Rood 1977 JMAS 489. 
54  As a possible alternative to indigenisation, the Zimbabwean Government could have 
considered a nationalisation policy which aims to benefit the nation as a whole as 
opposed to individuals and private companies owned by indigenous Zimbabweans. 
Nationalisation refers to the process when a government initiates "…asset seizure as 
part of social and economic reform to improve livelihoods of a country’s nationals". 
See Makoni 2014 COC 160. According to Atud, nationalisation could offer the 
following benefits to a country. It a) allows profits to be equitably distributed amongst 
more people, and the country as a whole; b) leads to regional economic growth and 
not just national economic growth; c) focuses more on citizens' social welfare as 
opposed to profiteering; d) leads to a country's greater economic performance and 
efficiency; and e) promotes employment creation and job security. Also see Atud 2011 
http://www.miningweekly.com/print-version/chamber-of-mines-2011-06-22 and 
Solomon 2012 http://www.saimm.co.za/Conferences/ResourceNationalism/Re 
sourceNationalism-20120601.pdf; Leon 2009 JENRL 33; and Libby and Woakes 1980 
ASR 33. See further Makoni 2014 COC 161-163 where she describes the mixed 
nationalisation experiences of Zambia, Chile, Venezuela and Norway. However, for 
nationalisation to be a success, the timing of the implementation of the programme 
should be right. There should also be qualified personnel to run the nationalised 
entities as well as capital available to fund the business operations of such entities. 
55  Robertson 2012 http://www.mikecampbellfoundation.com/images/Downloads/Indige 
nisation%20blocks%20recovery%20John%20R%2026%20July%2012.pdf. 
56  Efforts to realise the benefits of indigenisation have not achieved the intended 
objectives. Even supplementary policies aimed at strengthening Zimbabwe's economy 
so as to further enhance the viability of the indigenisation policies have not met with 
success. For example, the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic 
Transformation policy has failed due in part to the poor indigenisation policies. See 
Government of Zimbabwe Date Unknown http://www.dpcorp.co.zw/assets/zim-
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Against this background, unregulated, unethical and fraudulent practices 
such as business fronting, which subvert the pre-eminent objective of 
increasing the participation of the indigenous Zimbabweans57 in the 
economic mainstream, must be systematically confronted. 
3 Business fronting in Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwean courts have not had the opportunity to pass judgement on the 
troubling issue of business fronting and the duty of State organs in 
responding to allegations of fronting. This could be due in part to the 
politicised nature of the country's judicial system.58 The indigenisation 
programme was introduced and implemented at the behest of the ruling 
party, the Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF).59 
Not surprisingly, most of the current beneficiaries of the indigenisation 
programme are people sympathetic to ZANU-PF and its policies.60 These 
beneficiaries include members of the judiciary such as judges, who received 
farms forcefully taken from white owners at the height of the chaotic land 
reform programme.61 The persons who perpetrate violations of 
indigenisation laws also appear to be members of ZANU-PF, who know that 
as long as they are in the good books of the country's and party's leadership 
they will not be prosecuted.62 The practical result is that there is no rapidly 
developing jurisprudence on business fronting in Zimbabwe. However, this 
has not stopped concerns being raised in the media regarding incidents of 
business fronting. Surprisingly, President Robert Mugabe himself has 
added his voice to the increasing chorus of concerns about incidents of 
                                            
asset.pdf. Also see Zimbabwe Democracy Institute 2014 
http://www.zdi.org.zw/en/images/zimasset.pdf; and Sibanda 2013 
http://www.ruzivo.co.zw/publications/working-papers.html?download=49:Broad%20 
Based%20Economic%20Empowerment%20in%20Zimababwe-Matebeleland%20 
and%20Midlands_PIP%20Working%20Paper.pdf. 
57  Section 14(1) of the 2013 Zimbabwean Constitution. Also see s 2(1) of the IEEA. 
58  Chiduza 2014 PELJ 369. See also Madhuku 2002 JAL 232. 
59  Moyo "Land Reform and Redistribution" 29. Also see Mhiripiri 2009 JLS 83. 
60  Makombe 2013 http://www.plaas.org.za/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/LDPI20 
Makombe.pdf; Magure 2014 JAE 19; and Coltart 2008 https://www.cato.org/ 
publications/development-policy-analysis/decade-suffering-zimbabwe-economic-
collapse-political-repression-under-robert-mugabe. 
61  Selby 2007 http://www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/qehwp/qehwps143.pdf. Also see Selby 
Commercial Farmers. 
62  The need to observe the rule of law has been raised as a fundamental issue by the 
ousted former Zanu-PF member and also former Vice-President of Zimbabwe, Dr 
Joice Mujuru, who in launching the political manifesto for her new political party placed 
emphasis on ensuring that political bigwigs are subject to the law. See Article 8(iii) of 
the Blueprint to Unlock Investment and Leverage for Development (BUILD) (Mujuru 
2015 http://www.nehandaradio.com/2015/09/08/full-text-of-mujuru-manifesto/). 
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business fronting,63 which should, under the current economic crisis of 
Zimbabwe, be regarded as a serious crime.64 
Business fronting in Zimbabwe can be attributed to a number of factors. 
Among those involved are:  
a) disgruntled foreign investors who use corrupt and greedy well-
connected business elites to retain the investments they lost and/or 
stand to lose in the face of the aggressive indigenisation policy in 
Zimbabwe;65  
b) unscrupulous and well-connected elites who seek to maximise their 
returns from the spoils of the haphazard indigenisation programme;66 
and  
c) ordinary people who benefited from indigenisation programme on 
merit, accidentally or through political patronage, and have realised 
that the indigenisation programme lacks the necessary 
implementation-related financial support and is simply being used to 
score political points.67  
This realisation has made the ordinary citizens who are beneficiaries of the 
indigenisation programme comfortable with fronting for foreign business 
persons in return for huge sums of money which the government cannot 
offer them. These citizens have come to view the indigenisation 
programmes as counter-productive and a significant threat to investment 
security.68 It is thus not surprising that indigenisation policies are closely 
associated with the economic decline which has characterised Zimbabwe's 
economy in the last decade.69 
Business fronting has been covertly taking place in Zimbabwe70 probably 
because there is no specific legislation which provides authoritative 
guidance as to what fronting is or prescribes deterrent measures against 
                                            
63  Langa 2014 https://www.newsday.co.zw/2014/10/29/indigenous-businesspeople-
fronting-foreigners-mugabe/. 
64  Murombo 2010 SAPL 568. For an analysis of the effects of incoherent policies, also 
see Fredriksson and Svensson 2003 JPE 1383. 
65  Ndlela Financial Gazette 2. 
66  Ndlela Financial Gazette 2. 
67  Wynn 2013 http://ewn.co.za/2013/11/20/Blacks-fronting-for-whites-on-Zim-farms. 
68  Mpofu 2012 https://www.newsday.co.zw/2012/12/06/indigenisation-versus-juice 
which-is-the-way-forward. Also see Goko Daily News Zimbabwe 12. 
69  Zimudzi 2012 JCS 508.  
70  Republikein 2014 http://www.republikein.com.na/sakenuus/mugabe-warns-against-
fronting-foreign-firms.232808. Also see Gumede Corruption Fighting Efforts. 
TV WARIKANDWA & PC OSODE  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  14 
those who engage in the practice. In the absence of a specific piece of 
legislation which defines business fronting,71 how it is monitored and a 
prescription of the consequences, the fundamentally plausible programme 
will continue to flounder. As the law currently stands in Zimbabwe, practices 
which constitute fronting in the commercial arena are not clearly outlined for 
interpreters of the IEEA. But the success of any law lies largely in its clarity.72 
It is therefore submitted that the omission of specific business fronting 
provisions in the IEEA detailing the definition of the conduct, how it is to be 
policed and the consequences thereof undermines the attainment of the 
IEEA's transformative objectives.73 Under the law as it currently stands, any 
fraudulent and/or dishonest business conduct is dealt with in terms of the 
Criminal Law Codification and Reform Act (CLCRA).74 Under the CLCRA, 
the penalty for refusing to comply with the business-related provisions of the 
Act is a maximum fine at level 12,75 which is currently USD 2000, five years 
imprisonment or both.76 Such a penalty is clearly incapable of having a 
significant deterrent effect when compared to the real and potential benefits 
of the illicit practice.  
A closer analysis of the IEEA points to the existence of a number of clauses 
which appear to have been specifically included to preserve the interests of 
the wealthy in Zimbabwe.77 For example, the IEEA mandates the 
                                            
71  Anon 2013 http://businessdaily.co.zw/index-id-national-zk-32850.html. 
72  Tebbit Philosophy of Law 47. 
73  A comparison with the situation in South Africa will show that business fronting has 
been clearly defined, with its monitoring mechanisms clearly spelt out, as are its 
consequences. Namibia, which also seeks to come up with an indigenisation law, has 
included the definition of what fronting is in its New Equitable Economic Empowerment 
Framework Bill of 2016, which is still under consideration by the Namibian Parliament. 
See s 1(j) of the proposed NEEEF Bill.  
74  Criminal Law Codification and Reform Act 23 [Chapter 9:23] of 2004 (CLCRA). Also 
see the new schedule of offences which became effective with the introduction of the 
Finance Act 3 [Chapter 23:04] of 2009. 
75  See First Schedule of the CLCRA.  
76  The statutory punishment provided for in the CLCRA is also similar to the one referred 
to in s 10(3) of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (General) Regulations 
Statutory Instrument 21 of 2010 [CAP 14:33]. The sections make it an offense to fail 
to submit a form (IDG01) which shows that indigenisation requirements or a proposed 
business transaction such as a merger, foreign investment or unbundling of a business 
are accompanied by an acceptable indigenisation plan, in which case the penalty is a 
level 12 fine (USD 2000), five years imprisonment or both. 
77  For example, s 18(1) of the IEEA provides that any person who, "…under an obligation 
to do so, without lawful excuse, fails or refuses to pay, collect or remit any levy or any 
interest or surcharge connected therewith shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a 
fine not exceeding level six or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year or 
to both such fine and such imprisonment". In terms of the schedule of offences 
provided in the Finance Act 3 [Chapter 23:04] of 2009 a level six offence carries a fine 
of USD 300. Also see the First Schedule of the CLCRA. 
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responsible Minister to keep a record of individuals who stand as 
prospective beneficiaries of shareholder interests in non-indigenous 
companies.78 Further, the regulations provide the Minister with an 
essentially unlimited discretion to determine whether or not to accept or 
reject an indigenisation proposal or to attach conditions to the approval of 
such a proposal, a discretion which is conducive to the politics of 
patronage.79 Recent evidence produced before a parliamentary portfolio 
committee on Mines and Mineral resources revealed Community Trust 
pledges that were covert80 and unaccounted for,81 apparently made at the 
directive of the former Minister of Youth Empowerment and Indigenisation, 
Mr Saviour Kasukuwere,82 in respect of allegedly inaccurate and non-
existent indigenisation plans.83 
The chaotic state of affairs surrounding the Community Share Ownership 
Trusts (CSOTs) therefore makes it critically important to highlight the fact 
that the IEEA stipulates that "no appeal lies against a Ministerial decision to 
reject an indigenisation plan".84 Further, it provides that: 
                                            
78  Section 15(1) of IEEA. 
79  Section 5 of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (General) Regulations 
Statutory Instrument 21 of 2010 [CAP 14:33]. 
80  See the Portfolio Committee on Youth, Indigenization and Economic Empowerment 
2016 http://www.veritaszim.net/node/1891. In this report it is indicated that evidentiary 
proof in the form of a written letter from the Provincial Affairs Minister of Manicaland 
Province directing a diamond mining company to deposit contributions related to the 
CSOTs pledges into a named account (which is not a government account) was 
furnished before the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Youth Indigenisation and 
Economic Development. The Provincial Affairs Minister had in giving oral evidence 
denied any knowledge of such a letter. However, when the letter bearing the Minister’s 
signature was provided as evidence, the same Minister then argued that he could not 
remember that he had once written such a letter.  
81  See the Portfolio Committee on Youth, Indigenization and Economic Empowerment 
2016 http://www.veritaszim.net/node/1891. In one of the leading Community Share 
Ownership Trusts (CSOTs) called the Marange-Zimunya CSOT, diamond miners have 
not paid up their pledges and have even declared ignorance of the existence of such 
trusts. Other miners indicated that they only knew of USD 1.5 million. It was anticipated 
that mining companies, namely Mbada Diamonds, Diamond Mining Company (DMC), 
Anjin Investments, Jinan and Marange Resources would give USD50 million to the 
Marange and Zimunya communities under the CSOTs pledges arrangement, with 
each company contributing USD 10 million. However, the CSOTs, loosely referred to 
as a "gentleman's agreement", have thus far received only USD 400 000, with DMC 
mining services and Marange Resources paying USD 200 000 each. 
82  Mugabe and Gumbo 2014 http://www.herald.co.zw/pay-up-diamond-mining-firms-
told/. 
83  See Portfolio Committee on Mines and Energy 2013 http://petergodwin.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/Chininga-Parliament-Report-on-Marange-Diamond-Mining-
June-2013.pdf. 
84  Section 20 of IEEA. 
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… the noting of an appeal ... shall not, pending the determination of the 
appeal, suspend the decision, order or other action appealed against unless 
the Administrative Court directs otherwise.85  
As already highlighted above, Zimbabwean courts currently have a 
tendency not to act independently of the executive, as attempts to do so can 
lead to a purging of judicial officials.86 Accordingly, the implementation of 
legislation such as the IEEA can be manipulated to enrich politically 
connected indigenes and thereby promote, rather than discourage, the 
practice of business fronting in Zimbabwe.87 
4  Regulation of fronting in South Africa 
The fronting challenge in South Africa was exacerbated by the fact that, until 
2011, the courts had not definitively pronounced on government's duties in 
responding to fronting practices; but the opportunity arose in the landmark 
case of Viking Pony Africa Pumps (Pty) Ltd v Hidro-Tech Systems (Pty) 
Ltd.88 This case allowed the Constitutional Court to pronounce itself inter 
alia on the policy rationales of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), which 
it regarded as a constitutionally mandated governmental response to "one 
of the most vicious and degrading effects of racial discrimination in South 
Africa", being "…the economic exclusion and exploitation of black people".89 
The Constitutional Court's ruling in the Viking Pony case effectively imposes 
an obligation on an organ of state that has received a complaint about 
alleged fronting to properly investigate the complaint and to act 
accordingly.90 
The ruling in the Viking Pony case was followed in 2013 by the passing into 
law of the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Amendment Act 
                                            
85  Section 20(2) of IEEA. 
86  Chiduza 2014 PELJ 369. 
87  Magure 2012 JCAS 69. 
88  Viking Pony Africa Pumps (Pty) Ltd v Hidro-Tech Systems (Pty) Ltd 2011 2 BCLR 207 
(CC) (herein after Viking Pony). 
89  Viking Pony para 1. 
90  Viking Pony para 17. The Constitutional Court held that one of the main issues for 
determination was the meaning of "detect" and "act against" in reg 15 of the 
Preferential Procurement Regulations issued under GN 501 in GG 34350 of 8 June 
2011. Also see s 217 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, which 
provides that: "when an organ of state … contracts for goods or services, it must do 
so in accordance with a system which if fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and 
cost-effective". See further Millennium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson, 
Tender Board: Limpopo Province 2008 2 SA 481 (SCA) para 17-18; Chairperson, 
Standing Tender Committee v JFE Sapela Electronics (Pty) Ltd 2008 2 SA 638 (SCA) 
para 14; and Tetra Mobile Radio (Pty) Ltd v MEC, Department of Works 2008 1 SA 
438 (SCA) para 9. 
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(Amendment Act).91 Fronting in the Amendment Act is regulated in a 
combination of three ways focusing on: (a) definition, (b) monitoring, and (c) 
consequences. Fronting has often been used as a token of the superficial 
inclusion of historically disadvantaged persons into mainstream economic 
activities with no actual transfer of wealth or control.92 The provisions of the 
Amendment Act are intended to provide authoritative guidance as to what 
fronting is, and to prescribe deterrent measures against those who violate 
its provisions. The South African B-BBEE Amendment Act adopted a 
plausible dualist approach to addressing the challenge of defining business 
fronting; the one approach focusing on providing a comprehensive yet 
elastic definition of fronting and the other aimed at establishing a strong and 
properly resourced institutional framework for implementation.93 The first 
facet of the said definition is a broad, catch-all definition of what constitutes 
business fronting. In this regard section 1(e) of the B-BBEE Amendment Act 
defines "fronting practice" as: "a transaction, arrangement or other act or 
conduct that directly or indirectly undermines or frustrates the achievement 
of the objectives of this Act or the implementation of any of the provisions 
of this Act ...". Clearly, the wording of this broad definition includes the three 
most common forms of business fronting, namely window dressing,94 
benefit diversion95 and the use of opportunistic intermediaries.96 
                                            
91  Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Amendment Act 46 of 2013 (B-BBEEA 
Act). 
92  Mebratie and Bedi 2011 http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:101:1-201111029344. 
Also see Mbeki Architects of Poverty 66-68. 
93  Levenstein 2013 http://kasieconomics.com/2013/08/20/bee-fronting-legislation-has-
serious-implications/. 
94  Section 1(e)(a) of the B-BBEEA Act defines window dressing as an act of introducing 
black people to an enterprise on the "basis of tokenism and maybe in the form of: 1) 
discouraging or inhibiting them from substantively participating in the core activities of 
an enterprise and discouraging or inhibiting them from substantively participating in 
the stated areas and/or levels of the participation". Also see DTI 2013 
http://www.thedti.gov.za/economic_empowerment/fronting. 
95  Section 1(e)(b)-(c) of the B-BBEEA Act defines benefit diversion as "initiatives 
implemented where economic benefits received as a result of the B-BBEE status of 
an enterprise do not flow to black people in the ratio as specified in relevant legal 
documents". Also see Honeycomb Transformation 2013 
http://www.honeycombtransformation.co.za/fronting-companys-ownership/. 
96  Section 1(e)(d) of the B-BBEEA Act defines opportunistic intermediaries to include "... 
enterprises that have concluded agreements with other enterprises with a view to 
leveraging the opportunistic intermediary's favourable B-BBEE status in 
circumstances where the agreement involves: 1) significant limitations or restrictions 
upon the identity of the opportunistic intermediary's suppliers, service providers, 
clients or customers; 2) the maintenance of their business operations in a context 
reasonably considered improbable having regard to resources; 3) terms and 
conditions that are not negotiated at arms-length on a fair and reasonable basis". 
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The legislature through section 1(e) of the B-BBEE Amendment Act adopted 
a plausible, catch-all, open-ended definition of business fronting,97 which is 
an approach that is usually characterised by an element of vagueness 
intended, in this particular case, to ensure coverage of conduct or activities 
which may amount to business fronting but which may have been 
unwittingly excluded by the legislature.98 The second facet of the definition 
consists of a closed list of practices, conduct or situations falling within the 
regulatory scheme of business fronting.99 
In addition to the dual-faceted definition of fronting, the B-BBEE Amendment 
Act establishes a Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment 
Commission (B-BBEE Commission) which is required to effectively assume 
                                            
97  Section 1(e) of the B-BBEEA Act defines fronting as any "transaction, arrangement or 
other act or conduct that directly or indirectly undermines or frustrates the achievement 
of the objectives of the B-BBEE Act, including but not limited to practices in connection 
with the B-BBEE initiative…". 
98  National Credit Regulator v Opperman 2013 2 SA 1 (CC) para 48. It was pointed out 
in this case that the need for clarity in legislative instruments does not require absolute 
certainty. Also see Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health 2006 3 SA 247 
(CC) (Affordable Medicines) para 108; Raban 2010 PILJ 175. Also see Schauer 
Playing by the Rules 140; Scalia 1989 U Chi L Rev 1175; and Sustein 1995 CLR 1021; 
Raz 1972 Yale LJ 823, 841. See further Kaplow "General Characteristics of Rules" 
512-513; and Posner 1997 Harv JL & Pub Pol'y 101, 103.  
99  The challenges identified above as being likely to result from the element of 
vagueness inherent in a broad definition of "fronting" are certain to be mitigated by the 
second facet of the definition of "fronting" in the B-BBEEA Act, which explicitly 
identifies certain specific conducts as constituting fronting. This part of the definition s 
1(e) declares "fronting practice" as: "... including but not limited to practices" connected 
to a B-BBEE initiative – (a) in terms of which black persons who are appointed to an 
enterprise are discouraged or inhibited from substantially participating in the core 
activities of that enterprise; or (b) in terms of which the economic benefits received as 
a result of the broad-based black economic empowerment status of an enterprise do 
not flow to black people in the ratio specified in the relevant legal documentation". In 
addition, s 1(e)(c) provides that fronting includes practices in connection with a B-
BBEE initiative "involving the conclusion of a legal relationship with a black person for 
the purpose of the enterprise achieving a certain level of B-BBEE compliance without 
granting the black person economic benefits". Lastly, s 1(e)(d) provides that fronting 
includes practices in connection with a B-BBEE initiative: "involving the conclusion of 
an agreement with another enterprise in order to achieve or enhance B-BBEE status 
in circumstances in which i) there are significant limitations on the identity of suppliers 
... ii) the maintenance of business operations ... is reasonably considered improbable 
and iii) the terms and conditions were not negotiated ... on a fair and reasonable 
basis". Also see NDP Namboodripad v Union of India 2007 4 SCC 502; Hamdard 
(Wakf) Laboratories v Deputy Labour Commissioner 2007 5 SCC 281; Bharat 
Cooperative Bank (Mumbai) Ltd v Employees Union 2007 4 SCC 685; Himalayan Tiles 
and Marble (P) Ltd v Francis Victor Coutinho 1980 3 SCC 223; Dilworth v 
Commissioner of Stamps (Lord Watson) 1899 AC 99; and Mahalakshmi Oil Mills v 
State of AP 1989 AIR 335. 
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the role of the regulatory watchdog over issues pertaining to the B-BBEE 
Act.100 The B-BEE Commission which will be established as: 
… a juristic person with the duty of providing oversight to the B-BEEE process 
has the responsibility to: 1) investigate cases of fronting; 2) investigate 
complaints; and 3) receive and monitor reports on B-BBEE from organs of 
state and listed entities.101  
The role of the B-BBEE Commission102 could be likened to a limited extent 
to the role of the Anti-Corruption Commission in Zimbabwe.103 However, the 
difference between the two is that the B-BEE Commission deals with 
matters specifically related to the BEE programme, which makes it a 
specialised juristic person unlike the Anti-Corruption Commission, which 
has no defined area of speciality and appears to have been intended to deal 
with all matters of corruption.104 The effectiveness of such a commission is 
likely to be minimal, as it lacks expertise on the multiplicity of complex issues 
which are required to come before it. Further the Anti-Corruption 
Commissioners are appointed by the State President and function on the 
lines of political patronage, just like the judiciary in Zimbabwe, which fact 
places the prospects of the Commission’s effectiveness in serious doubt.105 
Furthermore, the penalties prescribed for business fronting under the B-
BBEE Amendment Act are fairly severe and therefore more likely to 
generate an effective deterrence effect than those in their Zimbabwean 
counterparts. This submission flows from the fact that the B-BBEE 
Amendment Act creates a number of offences and associated penalties.106 
For example, it creates an offence for the intentional misrepresentation of 
                                            
100  Section 8 of the B-BBEEA Act. Under this provision, s 13B is inserted into the B-BBEE 
Act to provide for the establishment and status of the B-BBEE Commission. 
101  Section 13B of the B-BBEEA Act. Also see s 13F of the B-BBEEA Act, which is titled 
"Functions of Commission", and s 13J of the B-BBEEA Act, which is titled 
"Investigations by the Commission". 
102  See s s13B and 13F of the B-BBEEA Act. 
103  See ss 12 and 13 of the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission Act 13 [Chapter 9:22] 
of 2004 (hereinafter the ZACA). 
104  Section 13F of the B-BBEEA Act. Also see s 13J of the B-BBEEA Act. Compare this 
with the preamble of the ZACA, which provides that the purpose of the Anti-corruption 
Commission is to address corruption "…as a matter of extreme urgency, and … fight 
corruption and … put in place measures and mechanisms that would eliminate the 
scourge of corruption…". It is submitted that one such mechanism which the 
Zimbabwean Anti-Corruption Commission is yet to advocate is an anti-fronting piece 
of legislation. Fronting requires a specialised legal instrument if it is to be effectively 
dealt with. 
105  See ss 4, 5 and 7 of the ZACA. 
106  See ss 13N, 13O and 13P of the B-BBEEA Act, titled "Offences in connection with 
Commission", "Other offences and penalties" and "Prohibition on business with organs 
of state following conviction under this Act". 
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information for the purposes of securing a favourable B-BBEE status; 
providing false information to a government entity; and failure by a public 
officer to report any offence in terms of the B-BBEE Act.107 A person 
convicted in terms of the B-BBEE Amendment Act could be liable to a fine108 
or imprisonment of up to ten years for a section 13O(1)(a)-(d)109 violation 
and a period not exceeding 12 months for a section 13O(2)110 violation. 
There is no guidance as to what the extent of imprisonment could be, as 
fronting is not yet specifically legislated against in the IEEA. However, based 
on the experience of the implementation of indigenisation and related 
regulations in Zimbabwe thus far, it is highly probable that a stiff penalty 
may be imposed on a person who is not politically connected and who is 
found to have engaged in conduct resembling business fronting. Another 
option available to the authorities in Zimbabwe is to rely on the level 12 
penalty provided in the CLCRA. That penalty currently stands at a miserly 
USD 2000 which, it is submitted, would hardly deter anyone from committing 
a potentially high profit-yielding economic crime such as business 
fronting.111 
In respect of juristic persons, the B-BBEE Amendment Act allows the 
imposition of a fine of up to a maximum of ten per cent of the juristic person's 
annual turnover.112 And in addition to the penalties, any person convicted of 
any offence under the B-BBEE Amendment Act may be banned from further 
contracting with any Government entity.113 It is submitted in this respect that 
                                            
107  Section 13N of the B-BBEEA Act. 
108  Section 13O(3)(a) of the B-BBEEA Act provides that "... if the convicted person is not 
a natural person ... a fine not exceeding ten per cent of its annual turnover will be 
preferred" where s 13O(1) is violated. S 13O(1)(a)-(d) prohibits misrepresentation or 
attempts to misrepresent the B-BBEE status of an enterprise, amongst other things. 
For a comprehensive list of such other types of prohibited conduct see ss 13O(1)(a)-
(d) of the B-BBEEA Act. Where the person is convicted of violating s 13O(2), which 
makes it an offence for a B-BBEE verification professional or any procurement officer 
to fail to report the making of an attempt to commit an offence listed in s 13O(1), the 
punishment shall be a fine as provided for in s 13O(3)(a) or both the fine and 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding 12 months. 
109  Section 13O(1)(a)-(d) of the B-BBEEA Act prohibits misrepresentation or attempts to 
misrepresent the B-BBEE status of an enterprise, amongst other things. 
110  Section 13O(2) of the B-BBEEA Act criminalises the failure by a B-BBEE verification 
professional or any procurement officer to report the making of an attempt to commit 
an offence listed in s 13O (1)(a)-(d). 
111  See the First Schedule on the Standard Scale of Fines of the CLCRA. 
112  Section 13P of the B-BBEEA Act.  
113  Section 13P of the B-BBEEA Act. Due to the fact that there is a lot of room for 
corruption when government tenders for goods or services, the Prevention and 
Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 requires the Minister of Finance to 
create a Register of Tender Defaulters which aims at addressing such incidents of 
corruption. The register is kept by the National Treasury. Should a person or business 
be convicted by a court of law of crimes involving contracts or tenders, its name and 
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the penalties imposed by the South African B-BBEEA Act are on the face of 
it sufficiently stiff to produce the much desired deterrence effect from the 
perspective of would-be offenders.114 In this regard the Zimbabwean 
legislative framework presents further significant weaknesses. The penalty 
of USD 2000 clearly does not match up to the ten years imprisonment or 
fine of 10% of the annual turnover of a company provided for in the South 
African legislative regime. This particular difference in the regulation of 
fronting between the two countries might explain why the practice exists in 
Zimbabwe. Accordingly, to the extent that fronting threatens to derail the 
country's controversial indigenisation programme, the penalty-related 
provisions of the Zimbabwean legislative framework stand to gain much 
strength from a reform process which embraces the South African approach 
as epitomising "best practice" in the prevention and regulation of business 
fronting. 
5  Lessons from South Africa 
The reason for South Africa’s adopting the anti-fronting legislation was that 
within a few years of introducing the Black Economic Empowerment 
(hereinafter BEE) programme115 it became evident that in practice the 
benefits were not reaching large numbers of those intended to be the 
beneficiaries of the programme.116 Rather, the pattern emerged of a few 
well-connected business elites colluding with politically connected black 
elites to capture the opportunities spawned by the programme.117 A robust 
and systematic approach had to be adopted to address this untenable 
situation.118 The result was the passing of the Broad-Based Black Economic 
                                            
details are recorded in this Register together with the details of the crime committed. 
This creates an additional penalty for the offenders. 
114  However, it should be noted that the efficacy of the penalty provisions in the B-BBEEA 
Act is yet to be proven in practice, as there are still no judicial precedents relating to 
the penalties prescribed under the B-BBEEA Act. This is obviously because the 
provisions have been in force for only a little over one year. 
115  See DTI 2003 http://www.thedti.gov.za/economic_empowerment/bee-strategy.pdf. 
Also see the Preamble of the B-BBEE Act. The B-BBEE Act seeks to establish a 
legislative framework for the promotion of black economic empowerment. 
116  Ncube Sunday Times. Also see the Foundation for the Development of Africa 2004 
http://www.foundation-development-africa.org/africa_black_business/fronting.htm. 
117  Andrews 2008 https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.aspx?Id=426 96. 
Also see Zuma "B-BBEE Not Just About Benefiting a Few Individuals"; Andreasson 
2011 B&S 647; Bogopane 2013 JSS 277. See further Yokogawa 2010 
http://www.yokogawa.com/za/cp/overview/za-bee.htm. 
118  BEE Commission National Integrated Black Economic Empowerment Strategy 2. Also 
see Osode "Advancing the Cause of Black Economic Empowerment" 261. Also see 
Kalula and M’Paradzi 2008 SJ 108. Also see Osode 2004 SJ 108; Southall 2007 RAPE 
83; and Cheadle, Thompson and Hayson Inc et al Black Economic Empowerment 1. 
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Empowerment Amendment Act (Herein after B-BBEE Amendment Act).119 
This Act amended the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act120 
with the primary objective of addressing all known and perceived 
weaknesses in the current regulatory framework.121 
It is submitted that Zimbabwe can draw lessons from South Africa's 
challenges with business fronting and related practices in the following 
ways: 
a) by acknowledging that in practice, the benefits of the indigenisation 
programme are not reaching large numbers of the previously 
disadvantaged indigenous Zimbabweans intended to be the 
beneficiaries, due to the prevalence of corrupt and unethical 
business practices such as business fronting, and hence, by 
accepting the need for effective regulatory mechanisms to address 
such a challenge; 
b) by adopting a clear definition of what amounts to business fronting, 
as has been done by South Africa in the B-BBEE Amendment Act of 
2013; 
c) by outlining the monitoring mechanisms for business fronting; and 
d) by clearly elaborating the consequences of fronting practices by way 
of the statutory prescription of severe penalties that will act as 
effective deterrents. 
                                            
119  Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Amendment Act 46 of 2013 (the B-
BBEEA Act). 
120  Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003. 
121  Viking Pony Africa Pumps (Pty) Ltd v Hidro-Tech Systems (Pty) Ltd 2011 2 BCLR 207 
(CC). Also see Millennium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson, Tender Board: 
Limpopo Province 2008 2 SA 481 (SCA) para 17-18; Chairperson, Standing Tender 
Committee v JFE Sapela Electronics (Pty) Ltd 2008 2 SA 638 (SCA) para 14; and 
Tetra Mobile Radio (Pty) Ltd v MEC, Department of Works 2008 1 SA 438 (SCA) para 
9; Esorfranki Pipelines v Mopani District Municipality 2014 2 All SA 493 (SCA); 
Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) Ltd v Genorah Resources (Pty) Ltd 2011 4 SA 113 (C) 
paras 83 and 84; Chairperson, Standing Tender Committee v JFE Sapela Electronics 
(Pty) Ltd 2008 2 SA 638 (SCA) para 27; Millennium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd v 
Chairperson, Tender Board: Limpopo Province 2008 2 SA 481 (SCA) para 23; Eskom 
Holdings Ltd v New Reclamation Group (Pty) Ltd 2009 4 SA 628 (SCA) para 9; and 
Moseme Road Construction CC v King Civil Engineering Contractors (Pty) Ltd 2010 4 
SA 359 (SCA) para 20; Quinot and Arrowsmith "Introduction" 1; and Arrowsmith 
"National and International Perspectives" 3. 
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6 Conclusion 
In their current state, Zimbabwe's IEEA and related Indigenisation and 
Economic Empowerment Regulations do not benefit most indigenous 
Zimbabweans. Instead, as correctly pointed out by Magure, they appear to 
be advancing the interests of politically connected elites.122 This is the result 
of deficiencies at the levels both of legal instrument design and of 
institutional enforcement. In parts one and five of this article it has been 
pointed out that the major deficiency of the IEEA is the omission to 
systematically address the problem of business fronting. Accordingly, it is 
proposed that the IEEA be amended and reinforced with anti-fronting 
provisions accompanied by effective enforcement mechanisms. Two 
possible approaches could be adopted, as follows: 
a) amending the IEEA by inserting provisions which specifically define 
what constitutes business fronting, how it is to be policed, and the 
consequences of engaging in fronting practices. This approach 
would make the IEEA a comprehensive one-stop-shop for obtaining 
adequate guidance on illegal and unethical business practices 
relating to indigenisation; or 
b) enacting a separate piece of legislation that regulates business 
fronting practices in the mould of South Africa's B-BBEE Amendment 
Act.  
Of the two proposed approaches, the first option would be preferred, as 
there is an already existing legal framework regulating indigenisation issues 
in the form of the IEEA. To that end, incorporating the anti-fronting 
provisions in that legislation would be more cost-effective and less time-
consuming.  
And in undertaking such a law reform process, Zimbabwe can draw valuable 
lessons from South Africa,123 which has recently amended its BEE 
legislation to combat business fronting. In promulgating the amendment 
statute, South African policy makers accepted that business fronting is a 
significant contributory factor preventing the success of the country’s 
                                            
122  Magure 2012 JCAS 68-69. Also see Matyszak 2010 
http://researchandadvocacyunit.org/system/files/Everything%20you%20ever%20wan
ted%20to%20know.pdf. 
123  Section 1(e) of the B-BBEEA Act. South Africa has adopted a dual approach of 
defining what constitutes business fronting. In addition to providing such a definition, 
the B-BBEEA Act prescribes the monitoring mechanisms and the consequences of 
engaging in business fronting. 
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indigenisation programme, especially by facilitating benefits diversion, 
creating opportunistic beneficiaries and thereby limiting the trickle-down 
effects as well as the overall impact of the related instruments and 
initiatives.124 It is against this background that the B-BBEE Amendment Act 
is commended to Zimbabwean law and policy makers as a model, seeing 
that it contains substantive definitional and implementation-related 
provisions which seem adequate to the task of addressing the formidable 
threat to the success of the indigenisation programme posed by business 
fronting. 
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